TITLE

Moral hazard

PUB. DATE
February 2004
SOURCE
Essential Economics;2004, p177
SOURCE TYPE
Book
DOC. TYPE
Reference Entry
ABSTRACT
A definition of the term "moral hazard" which means that people with insurance may take greater risks than they would do without it because they know they are protected is presented.
ACCESSION #
26024588

 

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