TITLE

Beyond Antitrust

AUTHOR(S)
Barnes, Peter; Shearer, Derek
PUB. DATE
July 1974
SOURCE
New Republic;7/6/74, Vol. 171 Issue 1/2, p17
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Focuses on the antitrust law in the U.S. Effects of the antitrust law on companies; Attacks against competitive public enterprise; Implications of the antitrust law for monitoring the performance of state industries; Possible revival of a lawsuit against General Motors for monopolizing the bus industry; Basis for breaking up large firms; Development of the idea of public enterprise; Competition in the energy industry.
ACCESSION #
9919216

 

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