TITLE

The Shapley value as the maximizer of expected Nash welfare

AUTHOR(S)
Kar, Anirban; Sen, Arunava
PUB. DATE
August 2014
SOURCE
International Journal of Game Theory;Aug2014, Vol. 43 Issue 3, p619
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
We provide an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value in TU games as the unique maximizer of expected Nash welfare.
ACCESSION #
96927599

 

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