TITLE

On $${\alpha }$$ -roughly weighted games

AUTHOR(S)
Freixas, Josep; Kurz, Sascha
PUB. DATE
August 2014
SOURCE
International Journal of Game Theory;Aug2014, Vol. 43 Issue 3, p659
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Gvozdeva et al. (Int J Game Theory, doi:, ) have introduced three hierarchies for simple games in order to measure the distance of a given simple game to the class of (roughly) weighted voting games. Their third class $${\mathcal {C}}_\alpha $$ consists of all simple games permitting a weighted representation such that each winning coalition has a weight of at least $$1$$ and each losing coalition a weight of at most $$\alpha $$ . For a given game the minimal possible value of $$\alpha $$ is called its critical threshold value. We continue the work on the critical threshold value, initiated by Gvozdeva et al., and contribute some new results on the possible values for a given number of voters as well as some general bounds for restricted subclasses of games. A strong relation between this concept and the cost of stability, i.e. the minimum amount of external payment to ensure stability in a coalitional game, is uncovered.
ACCESSION #
96927593

 

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