Belief and Disbelief for Interpreters

March 2014
Legacy (National Association for Interpretation);Mar/Apr2014, Vol. 25 Issue 2, p27
Academic Journal
The article discusses the role of belief in successful interpretation. It states that one has a complex system of beliefs which defines who one is, and that deep interpretation aims to link widely divergent belief systems. On the other hand, disbelief of inconvenient truths is reportedly also needed to maintain one' equilibrium. The article notes that believability derives from credibility, which requires understanding and respect for one's beliefs and that of others.


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