TITLE

Announcements and the Role of Policy Guidance

AUTHOR(S)
Walsh, Carl E.
PUB. DATE
November 2013
SOURCE
Review (00149187);Nov/Dec2013, Vol. 95 Issue 6, p575
SOURCE TYPE
Trade Publication
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
By providing guidance about future economic developments, central banks can affect private sector expectations and decisions. This can improve welfare by reducing private sector forecast errors, but it can also magnify the impact of noise in central bank forecasts. I employ a model of heterogeneous information to compare outcomes under opaque and transparent monetary policies. While better central bank information is always welfare improving, more central bank information may not be. (JEL E52, E58)
ACCESSION #
93980193

 

Related Articles

  • A Simple Empirical Measure of Central Banks' Conservatism. Levieuge, Grégory; Lucotte, Yannick // Southern Economic Journal;Oct2014, Vol. 81 Issue 2, p409 

    In this article we suggest a simple empirical and model-independent measure of Central Banks' Conservatism based on the Taylor curve. This new indicator can easily be extended in time and space, whatever the underlying monetary regime of the countries considered. We demonstrate that our measure...

  • MACROECONOMIC POLICIES AND ISSUES.  // OECD Economic Surveys: Mexico;Apr2002, Vol. 2002 Issue 7, p33 

    Reports on the monetary policy of Mexico. Framework of the Mexican monetary policy; Impact on inflation; Performance of the central bank.

  • FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY: ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS. Schneider Jr., Franz // Foreign Affairs;Jul1929, Vol. 7 Issue 4, p543 

    The policy of central banks, and the international implications of what they do, plainly have become matters of intense public interest in 1928-and not, unfortunately, altogether in a manner to promote sound judgements and just conclusions. In the U.S. the policy and performances of the Federal...

  • Learning the monetary/fiscal interaction under trend inflation. Florioa, Anna; Gobbi, Alessandro Q. // Oxford Economic Papers;Oct2015, Vol. 67 Issue 4, p1146 

    How does a higher inflation target affect determinacy and learnability of rational expectations equilibria under alternative monetary/fiscal policy mixes in new Keynesian models? What is the role of central bank transparency? This article proves that in a non-Ricardian regime, determinacy and...

  • Uncertainty and Fiscal Policy in an Asymmetric Monetary Union. Hefeker, Carsten; Zimmer, Blandine // Open Economies Review;Feb2011, Vol. 22 Issue 1, p163 

    We examine monetary and fiscal interactions in a monetary union model with uncertainty due to imperfect central bank transparency. It is first shown that monetary uncertainty discourages excessive taxation and may thus reduce average inflation and output distortions. However, as countries enter...

  • Part II - Monetary Policy.  // Central Bank of Trinidad & Tobago Monetary Policy Report;Apr2012, Vol. 12 Issue 1, p15 

    The article reports on the monetary policy of Trinidad and Tobago as of April 2012. It notes the continued expansion of private sector lending with the increase of the sector's credit grant by 3.1 percent in March 2012. It points out that there was liquidity build up in financial system despite...

  • Egypt: Could Next Interest Rate Move Be Up?  // Emerging Markets Monitor;6/19/2006, Vol. 12 Issue 11, p21 

    Speculates on Egypt's response to rising consumer price inflation. Approach used by other countries to control inflation; Overview of the monetary policy statement from the Central Bank of Egypt.

  • Still Room For Another Cut.  // Emerging Markets Monitor;9/1/2003, Vol. 9 Issue 20, p15 

    Reports on recommendations for the Polish monetary policy as of September 2003. Decision of the monetary policy committee with regard to rates; Advice given by Central Bank Governor Leszek Balcerowicz concerning the policy.

  • Effective Central Bank Communication under Uncertainty. Huang, Kevin X. D. // Journal of Economic Issues (Association for Evolutionary Economi;Sep2007, Vol. 41 Issue 3, p661 

    This article discusses how central banks have become more transparent and how the trend has coincided with a move toward greater central bank independence. Experts suggest that transparency is necessary to satisfy the principle of democratic accountability by central banks. Political...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of NEW JERSEY STATE LIBRARY

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics