TITLE

Games people do not play

AUTHOR(S)
Gale, David
PUB. DATE
June 1993
SOURCE
Mathematical Intelligencer;Summer93, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p58
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Presents theorems on the winning strategies for the second player in a memory game using an uncountable deck of cards. Zero-memory game as a special case of Martin Furer and Ernst Specker's result; Use of the axiom of choice and well-ordering in Richard Laver and Krzysztof's result.
ACCESSION #
9311091242

 

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