The problem of the basing relation

Evans, Ian
September 2013
Synthese;Sep2013, Vol. 190 Issue 13, p2943
Academic Journal
In days past, epistemologists expended a good deal of effort trying to analyze the basing relation—the relation between a belief and its basis. No satisfying account was offered, and the project was largely abandoned. Younger epistemologists, however, have begun to yearn for an adequate theory of basing. I aim to deliver one. After establishing some data and arguing that traditional accounts of basing are unsatisfying, I introduce a novel theory of the basing relation: the dispositional theory. It begins with the pedestrian observation that beliefs stand or fall with their bases. The theory I offer is an elucidation and refinement of this thought.


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