TITLE

A puzzle about belief updating

AUTHOR(S)
Martini, Carlo
PUB. DATE
October 2013
SOURCE
Synthese;Oct2013, Vol. 190 Issue 15, p3149
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976 )), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007 )). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.
ACCESSION #
91988651

 

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