Evolutionary Dynamics of Resource Allocation in the Colonel Blotto Game

Hernández, Damián; Zanette, Damián
May 2013
Journal of Statistical Physics;May2013, Vol. 151 Issue 3/4, p623
Academic Journal
We provide an evolutionary game-theoretical formulation for a model of resource allocation-the Colonel Blotto game. In this game, two players with different total resources must entirely distribute them among a set of items. Each item is won by the player that assigned higher resources to it, and the payoff of each player is the total number of won items. Our evolutionary formulation makes it possible to obtain optimal strategies as the equilibrium states of a dynamical process. At the same time, it naturally requires considering a population of players-whose strategies evolve by imitation and random fluctuations-thus better approaching a realistic situation with many economic agents. Results show, in particular, how agents with low total resources manage to maximize their winnings in spite of their intrinsically disadvantageous condition.


Related Articles

  • A zero-sum game of resource allocation: Attacker against defender. Morozov, V.; Shalbuzov, K. // Automation & Remote Control;Nov2015, Vol. 76 Issue 11, p2045 

    The paper studies a zero-sum game of resource allocation. Each player can use several types of facilities limited by its budget. The attacker's payoff is the probability of its strategy to overcome a defender's strategy. The authors derive the existence conditions of pure and mixed strategy...

  • Games people could play. Gale, David // Mathematical Intelligencer;Summer93, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p59 

    Discusses the winning strategies for the game Chomp, a variation on Nim, which is played using a rectangular array of `cookies'. Description of the game; Strategies for cookies arranged in two rows with an infinite number of rows and in an infinite number of rows and columns; Scott Huddleston's...

  • One false move and it's over.... Stewart, Ian // New Scientist;9/4/93, Vol. 139 Issue 1889, p32 

    Proves that in games like chess, noughts and crosses and Go, either one player always has a winning strategy or all perfect-play games must be draws. Definitions of the winner, loser and drawer games; Pruning the game tree to find the value of the opening state; Spotting the strategy in the...

  • A BOUND ON THE PROPORTION OF PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA IN GENERIC GAMES. Gul, Faruk; Pearce, David // Mathematics of Operations Research;Aug93, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p548 

    Proves that in a generic finite normal form game with a 2x + 1 Nash equilibria, at least x of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria. Nash equilibria as the fixed points of a continuous function g on a compact convex set; Function g as a Leftchetz function; Pure strategy...

  • Games people play. Gale, David // Mathematical Intelligencer;Summer93, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p56 

    Presents Michael Paterson and Uri Zwick's analysis of the card game `Concentration'. Optimal strategy for an opponent who always turns over a second card when she does not get a match; Optimal strategy with two equally sophisticated players.

  • Games people do not play. Gale, David // Mathematical Intelligencer;Summer93, Vol. 15 Issue 3, p58 

    Presents theorems on the winning strategies for the second player in a memory game using an uncountable deck of cards. Zero-memory game as a special case of Martin Furer and Ernst Specker's result; Use of the axiom of choice and well-ordering in Richard Laver and Krzysztof's result.

  • Author's Note. Kuhn, Harold W. // Lectures on the Theory of Games;2003, preceding p1 

    An introduction to the book "Lectures on the Theory of Games," by Harold W. Kuhn is presented.

  • A Behavioral Experiment in Sales Effort Allocation. Green, Paul E.; Halbert, Michael H.; Robinson, Patrick J. // Journal of Marketing Research (JMR);Aug1966, Vol. 3 Issue 3, p261 

    This article is concerned with the effect of a problem's environmental context on the learning of on ‘optimal’ allocation role. A series of soles allocation problems were presented to groups of executive and student subjects. While the allocation principle remained invariant over...

  • The value of a player in n-person games. Hausken, Kjell; Mohr, Matthias // Social Choice & Welfare;2001, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p465 

    The article decomposes the Shapley value into a value matrix which gives the value of every player to every other player in n-person games. Element F[sub ij] (v) in the value matrix is positive, zero, or negative, dependent on whether row player i is beneficial, has no impact, or is not...


Read the Article


Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics