Williams on the Normative Silence of Indeterminacy

Eklund, Matti
April 2013
Analysis;Apr2013, Vol. 73 Issue 2, p264
Academic Journal
In his recent Analysis article (2012), Robert Williams considers two puzzles relating to indeterminacy. On the basis of these puzzles, he defends a seemingly radical view on the normative role of indeterminacy. He speaks of indeterminacy as ‘normatively silent’. There are two ways of understanding the view that Williams defends. On one understanding, the view ends up being indistinguishable from one of the more traditional views Williams rejects, the view that phenomena of different kinds fall under the umbrella level ‘indeterminacy’. On the other understanding, Williams’s view is genuinely radical but his arguments don't adequately support it.


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