TITLE

Time

AUTHOR(S)
Tallant, Jonathan
PUB. DATE
April 2013
SOURCE
Analysis;Apr2013, Vol. 73 Issue 2, p369
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article focuses on a study conducted by the author to explore the philosophy of time. The author discusses the thinking attitude of presentists towards present times and true propositions about the past. It informs about various explanations that were introduced by philosophy experts regarding the truth making theories.
ACCESSION #
86428873

 

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