TITLE

El desorden de las cosas y el problema de la demarcación

AUTHOR(S)
García Duque, Carlos Emilio
PUB. DATE
February 2013
SOURCE
Revista Estudios de Filosofía;feb2013, Issue 46, p61
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I analyze John Dupré's criticisms of the methodological unity of science. As it is known, from the premise of the disorder of things, Dupré rejects both strong and weak variants of unification, but his best arguments against the latter suppose that there is no satisfactory solution to the problem of demarcation. After examining Dupré's arguments for the implausibility of any weak formulation of the thesis of the unity of science (including those focused on methodological unity), I shall explain his formulation of the problem of demarcation, examine his characterization of Popper's theory of falsifiability, and answer his arguments against Popper's view on empirical science. My arguments shall show the inadequacy of Dupré's treatment of this problem and suggest a way to see how Popper's solution to the problem of demarcation, by way of the criterion of falsifiability, supports a defense of a non-reductionist version of the unity of science.
ACCESSION #
86171721

 

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