TITLE

Moral responsibility and the continuation problem

AUTHOR(S)
Mele, Alfred
PUB. DATE
January 2013
SOURCE
Philosophical Studies;Jan2013, Vol. 162 Issue 2, p237
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Typical incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism contend that being basically morally responsible for a decision one makes requires that, if that decision has proximal causes, it is not deterministically caused by them. This article develops a problem for this contention that resembles what is sometimes called the problem of present (or cross-world) luck. However, the problem makes no reference to luck nor to contrastive explanation. This article also develops a solution.
ACCESSION #
84579267

 

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