TITLE

Pautas históricas de despliegue de servicios de inteligencia en Afganistán: Consideraciones históricas y análisis de lecciones aprendidas

AUTHOR(S)
Rodríguez, Juan Ferrer
PUB. DATE
January 2012
SOURCE
Inteligencia y Seguridad: Revista de Análisis y Prospectiva;Ene-Jun2012, Issue 11, p43
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Los servicios de inteligencia españoles se han enfrentado en los últimos años a nuevos retos y amenazas de carácter asimétrico en el exterior (Afganistán, Somalia, Líbano, Irak, etc.) por lo que surge la necesidad de realizar una teoría sobre su despliegue a nivel estratégico en zonas de alto riesgo. Para realizar este análisis, el teatro de operaciones de Afganistán nos proporciona el marco histórico adecuado para revisar las pautas comunes de los despliegues de servicios de inteligencia británicos y rusos durante el conocido como Gran Juego del siglo XIX, así como la actuación de la inteligencia soviética, norteamericana y pakistaní durante los años ochenta y el posterior despliegue norteamericano como consecuencia de los atentados del 11 de septiembre.En este contexto, la capacidad de cultural awareness o conciencia cultural aparece íntimamente ligado a la teoría de despliegue de servicios de inteligencia en zonas de alto riesgo en la medida que se considera fundamental para evitar el enfoque del uso exclusivo de la inteligencia en la protección de la fuerza y en la eliminación física de la insurgencia y conseguir de este modo la capilaridad en los órganos de obtención y el desarrollo de estructuras de inteligencia locales.
ACCESSION #
80032186

 

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