Knowledge and True Belief in Early Analytic Philosophy

Martens, David B.
August 2012
South African Journal of Philosophy;2012, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p576
Academic Journal
I argue that the sufficiency of true belief for knowledge was accepted by some principal figures in the early history of analytic philosophy, including Russell, Schlick, McTaggart, and Moore, among others.


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