Allocating Profit Among Rational Players in a Fuzzy Coalition: A Game Theoretic Model

Borkotokey, Surajit; Neog, Rupok
July 2012
Group Decision & Negotiation;Jul2012, Vol. 21 Issue 4, p439
Academic Journal
In this paper, the problem of allocation of the profit, obtained from a fuzzy coalition, among its players is considered. It is argued that this allocation is influenced by satisfaction of the players in regards to better performance and success within a cooperative endeavour. Our model is based on the real life situations, where possibly one or more players compromise on their payoffs in order to help forming a coalition. We have developed a dynamic approach to obtain a suitable solution to the corresponding cooperative fuzzy game. Further, the notion of a penalty among the bargaining players is introduced. This would inflict them to reasonable demands only.


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