TITLE

DUMMETT'S FORWARD ROAD TO FREGE AND TO INTUITIONISM

AUTHOR(S)
Dejnožka, Jan
PUB. DATE
September 2010
SOURCE
Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy;Dec2010, Issue 25, p118
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the concepts of intuitionism introduced by Michael Dummett. As stated, Dummett makes it clear that there is only a forward road from senses to references in the cognitive order. It mentions that Dummett has stated that the systematic theory of Bedeutung provided a basis for explaining in what the sinn of an expression should be taken to consist. It states that Dummett is right that indefinable notions must be explicated but undefined notions must be explicated too. It states that however there is no road from syntax to semantics, and no road from physical shape to proper namehood.
ACCESSION #
76115145

 

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