Seattle Fall Ballot Figures to Be Long on Transportation Plans
- Zug oder Flug? Eine empirische Studie zur Verkehrsmittelwahl fÃ¼r innereuropÃ¤ische Reisen. Franzen, Axel // Zeitschrift fÃ¼r Soziologie;feb1998, Vol. 27 Issue 1, p53
No abstract available.
- On the difficulty of making social choices. Nurmi, Hannu // Theory & Decision;Jan95, Vol. 38 Issue 1, p97
Discusses the difficulty of making social choices. Types of difficulties; Review of computer simulations pertaining to the discrepancies of the choice sets of various procedures in various cultures; Description of the relationships between various solution concepts in tournaments.
- On admissible strategies and manipulation of social choice procedures. Mbih, Boniface // Theory & Decision;Sep95, Vol. 39 Issue 2, p169
Discusses how individuals involved in a collective decision problem can construct the preferences they choose to express. Manipulation of social choice procedures; Admissible strategies; Successive elimination of dominated strategies; Theorem proving.
- Independent social choice correspondences. Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. // Theory & Decision;Jul96, Vol. 41 Issue 1, p1
Focuses on independent social choice correspondences. Background information; Preliminaries; Propositions; Theorems.
- Majority voice of even and odd experts in a polychotomous choice situation. Lam, Louisa; Suen, Ching Y // Theory & Decision;Jul96, Vol. 41 Issue 1, p13
Studies the performance of group consensus in a situation of polychotomous choice. Background information; General results on the probability of consensus; Model; Relaxation of equal probability assumption.
- Why preference is not transitive. Gendin, Sidney // Philosophical Quarterly;Oct96, Vol. 46 Issue 185, p482
Argues that preference in social choice theory is not transitive. Traditional presuppositions of social choice theory; Features of so-called `normal' transitivity; Features of the alleged transitivity of indifference.
- Incompatibility of strategy-proofness and the Condorcet principle. Campbell, Donald E.; Kelly, Jerry S. // Social Choice & Welfare;1998, Vol. 15 Issue 4, p583
Abstract. For social choice rules that can select either one or two alternatives, strategy-proofness is incompatible with a weak Condorcet principle. Received: 8 July 1996/Accepted: 9 June 1997
- Negatively interdependent preferences. Ok, Efe A.; Kockesen, Levent // Social Choice & Welfare;2000, Vol. 17 Issue 3, p533
Abstract. We develop a theory of representation of interdependent preferences that reflect the widely acknowledged phenomenon of keeping up with the Joneses (i.e. of those preferences which maintain that well-being depend on "relative standing" in the society as well as on material consumption)....
- Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives. Reiju Mihara, H. // Social Choice & Welfare;2000, Vol. 17 Issue 3, p393
Abstract. In a framework allowing infinitely many individuals, I prove that coalitionally strategy proof social choice functions satisfy "tops only." That is, they depend only on which alternative each individual prefers the most, not on which alternative she prefers the second most, the...