TITLE

Game Theory as a Yardstick for Antitrust Leniency Policy: the US, EU, and Italian Experiences in a Comparative Perspective

AUTHOR(S)
Amedeo Arena
PUB. DATE
March 2011
SOURCE
Global Jurist;Mar2011, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p1376
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The allocative and productive inefficiencies generated by cartels have induced many governments to tackle them aggressively, thus making those agreements increasingly difficult to detect. Rewarding firms that help expose cartels with immunity or fine reductions is generally believed to enhance the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement, but no consensus exists as to how to frame leniency policies in order to maximize the incentives for firms to co-operate with antitrust authorities.
ACCESSION #
67210912

 

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