TITLE

Understanding and Mathematical Fictionalism†

AUTHOR(S)
Armour-Garb, Bradley
PUB. DATE
October 2011
SOURCE
Philosophia Mathematica;Oct2011, Vol. 19 Issue 3, p335
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In a recent paper in this journal, Mark Balaguer develops and defends a new version of mathematical fictionalism, what he calls ‘Hermeneutic non-assertivism’, and responds to some recent objections to mathematical fictionalism that were launched by John Burgess and others.In this paper I provide some fairly compelling reasons for rejecting Hermeneutic non-assertivism — ones that highlight an important feature of what understanding mathematics involves (or, as we shall see, does not involve).
ACCESSION #
66731544

 

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