September 2011
USA Today Magazine;Sep2011, Vol. 140 Issue 2796, p58
The article explains why getting at the truth is a challenge and makes it difficult to recognize misconceptions. It adds that the biggest perpetrators of lies are people who sell incomplete versions of available truth, people's willingness to believe what they want, and the lack of accurate data. It also explains the different types of truths as seen from various vantage points such as objective truth, subjective truth and consensus truths.


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