TITLE

Research on combinatorial auction

AUTHOR(S)
Liu Xin-ming
PUB. DATE
June 2010
SOURCE
Proceedings of the International Symposium on Electronic Commerc;Jun2010, p288
SOURCE TYPE
Conference Proceeding
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Since the mid-20th century, with the Nash equilibrium theory formulation and development, game theory has gradually become a new subject. It involves economics, management, computer science, sociology and other fields, which has played a significant role in promoting the development of society. This article focuses on some specific issues in game theory about optimization algorithms and compare, as well as the analysis and probe for parallel degree and improvement that running under its high-performance platform. This paper will use the detailed data to in-depth analysis specific examples of "combinatorial auctions".
ACCESSION #
65544559

 

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