Throwing brickbats at the BIF-bashers
Tags: BANK insurance; BANK failures; RESERVES (Accounting)
Related Articles
- Federal Deposit Insurance Coverage and Bank Failures: A Cointegration Analysis with Semi-Annual Data, 1965-91. Saltz, Ira // Journal of Economics & Finance;Fall97, Vol. 21 Issue 3, p3
Examines the link between bank failures and statutorially created increases in the extent of the federal deposit insurance coverage in the U.S. Percentage of deposits at federally insured banks; Tangible capital/asset ratio; Commercial bank cost of funds; Prime rate of interest.
- 2010 Bank Failure Rate Might Mirror Last Year. Allen, Mike // San Diego Business Journal;2/1/2010, Vol. 31 Issue 5, p6
No abstract available.
- Failed Colo. bank to cost BIF $150M in subprime card loss. Barancik, Scott // American Banker;1/19/1999, Vol. 164 Issue 11, p2
Reports that the Bank Insurance Fund expects to lose on failed Colorado-based BestBank five times more than the estimate of the United States Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC). Expected loss amount; Typical losses on small banks; Causes of the bank's losses; BestBank's operations of its...
- Branches Growing Amid Decline in Number of Banks. // Community Banker;Jan2004, Vol. 13 Issue 1, p54
Reports that banks continue to grow branches amid decline in number of banks. Number of branches of U.S. insured depositories; Percentage of increase of bank branches; Increase of branches of savings bank in 2003; Total number of branches added to commercial banks as of 2003; Total number of...
- Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance? Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System. Wheelock, David C.; Kumbhakar, Subal C. // Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Ohio State University Press);Feb95, Vol. 27 Issue 1, p186
The article focuses on the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard problems within voluntary systems for bank deposit insurance. Systemic economic problems inherent within the U.S. federal deposit insurance system towards encouraging bank failure are mentioned, highlighting the adoption...
- Stability in the Absence of Deposit Insurance: The Canadian Banking System, 1890-1966. CARR, JACK; MATHEWSON, FRANK; QUIGLEY, NEIL // Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Ohio State University Press);Nov95 1 of 2, Vol. 27 Issue 4, p1137
The article presents an examination into the banking records of Canada within the era of 1890-1966, outlining the phenomena of stability despite the absence of a deposit insurance scheme. Questions regarding the causes for the financial stability are raised, challenging existing research...
- Who Should Act as Lender of Last Resort? An Incomplete Contracts Model. REPULLO, RAFAEL // Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Ohio State University Press);Aug2000 Part 2 of 2, Vol. 32 Issue 3, p580
This paper presents a model of a bank subject to liquidity shocks that require borrowing from a lender of last resort. Two government agencies may perform this function: a central bank and a deposit insurance corporation. The agencies share supervisory information, which provides a nonverifiable...
- Bank Regulation: Analysis of the Failure of Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois: GAO-02-419T. // GAO Reports;2/7/2002, p1
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has projected that the failure of Superior Bank could cost the deposit insurance fund as much as $526 million. A major reason for the failure was Superior Bank's business strategy of originating and securing subprime loans on a large scale. In...
- 'Dismal' 2Q Puts FDIC Premiums On the Table. Adler, Joe // American Banker;8/27/2008, Vol. 173 Issue 166, p1
The author reports on the amount of money which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) put aside to cover the costs of bank failures for the second quarter of 2008. Decreases which have occurred regarding profits experienced by the financial services industry from the second quarter of 2007...
