TITLE

More Weapons for What?

AUTHOR(S)
Burnham, James
PUB. DATE
February 1977
SOURCE
National Review;2/4/1977, Vol. 29 Issue 4, p140
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article compares the defensive status of the Soviet Union and the United States. It is indicated that the Soviet Union is improving its position relative to the U.S. and is being considered superior to the U.S. in defense readiness. The Soviet Union government is concentrating on producing more and more formidable weapons in sufficient quantity to reverse the unfavorable weapons-power ratio. The decline in the U.S. relative weapons position has come about under the strategic concept of detente.
ACCESSION #
6074053

 

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