TITLE

Beyond MAD

PUB. DATE
September 1977
SOURCE
National Review;9/2/1977, Vol. 29 Issue 34, p984
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the military policies of the U.S. The nuclear policy of the U.S. has been guided by the mutual assured destruction doctrine. The U.S. has limited the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Senator Paul Warnke has been put in charge of disarmament negotiations with the Soviet Union. If the U.S. wants to maintain the credibility of its strategic deterrence, then the government must be prepared to develop and maintain various weapons and defense systems.
ACCESSION #
6056235

 

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