TITLE

Profitability of the Name-Your-Own-Price Channel in the Case of Risk-Averse Buyers

AUTHOR(S)
Shapiro, Dmitry
PUB. DATE
March 2011
SOURCE
Marketing Science;Mar/Apr2011, Vol. 30 Issue 2, p290
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In this paper, I study profitability of the name-your-own-price channel (NYOP) in the presence of risk-averse buyers. First, I provide conditions that guarantee that for the monopolistic seller the NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Second, I consider a more competitive framework where buyers with rejected bids have access to an alternative option. I show that if under the posted-price scenario there are unserved customers with low valuations, then NYOP is more profitable than the posted price. Finally, I study whether adding the posted-price option to the NYOP will further increase the seller's profit and show that for the decreasing absolute risk-aversion utility and a monopolistic seller it does not. In the presence of an alternative option, the answer depends on whether buyers consider the posted-price option and the alternative option to be close substitutes or not. Adding the posted-price option will increase the profit in the former case and will not in the latter.
ACCESSION #
60199412

 

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