Peterson, Richard B.
April 1970
Monthly Labor Review;Apr70, Vol. 93 Issue 4, p48
Academic Journal
Examines levels of worker influence on managerial decisions or policy in Swedish enterprises. Analysis of responses to a questionnaire sent to firms in Sweden; Emphasis on managerial prerogatives; Practice of consultation in Swedish collective bargaining; Scarcity of unilateral decisionmaking by the worker and his trade union.


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