SEC on executive pay
Tags: EXECUTIVE compensation; STOCKHOLDERS
Related Articles
- Coverage crunch. Daniels, Steve // Crain's Chicago Business;4/15/2002, Vol. 25 Issue 15, p13
Focuses on the increase in the cost of insuring executives and board members against shareholder lawsuits by companies in Chicago, Illinois. Reduction of coverage to cut employee rates; Percentage of increases paid by companies in the stock market; Continuity to acquire directors-and-officers...
- Compensation Committee chairs wary on executive pay. // Corporate Board;Nov/Dec90, Vol. 11 Issue 65, p27
Reports on the importance of ensuring a link between executive compensation and shareholder interests, according to a survey of Compensation Committee chairmen. Solutions for inequitable annual bonuses and benefits; Percentage of long-term incentives and salary at the chief executive officer level.
- Package + performance. Pagano, Margareta // Management Today;Jan98, p70
Focuses on the question of why the salaries of top executives in Great Britain are above-average for below-average performance, while discussing the shareholder value. Reference to the Greek philosopher, Plato; Details on the share option scheme; Findings of a survey by Monks Partnership...
- Start rolling back the CEO options express. Ferlauto, Richard // Pensions & Investments;02/05/2001, Vol. 29 Issue 3, p12
Reports the complaint of institutional investors against executive pay packages. Effect of giving excessive equity allocations; List of shareholder agenda for shareholder resolution; Implication of increasing proportion of companies; Impact of increasing severance of pay-off packages for failed...
- The Shareholder. Sargent, Joseph // Global Finance;Nov99, Vol. 13 Issue 11, p33
Reports on the proposals of Stephen Byers, secretary of state for trade and industry in Great Britain, that would enable shareholders to monitor executive pay more closely than ever before. Components of most option programs; Statements from Byers; Comments from Mary Francis, director general...
- 'Say on Pay': If You Can't Beat 'Em�. Cook, Frederic W. // NACD Directorship;Jun/Jul2008, Vol. 34 Issue 3, p62
No abstract available.
- Forward-thinking HR should head off shareholder rebellion. Cockman, Richard // Personnel Today;6/3/2003, p16
As shareholders dissatisfaction with directors benefits grows, HR will need to demonstrate a clear link between rewards and company performance if it is to throw off accusations of heavy pay-offs. The value of share options will hit companies' profits and losses and the new lifetime limit on...
- Managerial Control and Executive Compensation in the 1930s: A Reexamination. Santerre, Rexford E.; Neun, Stephen P. // Quarterly Journal of Business & Economics;Autumn89, Vol. 28 Issue 4, p100
This article reexamines an earlier empirical study by Stigler and Friedland [14] on the relationship between stockholder control and executive compensation for a sample of firms in the 1930s. They find no significant empirical relation between these two variables, casting some doubt on the...
- Golden parachutes and shark repellents and shareholders' interests: Some new evidence. Chakraborty, Atreya // Global Finance Journal;Apr2008, Vol. 18 Issue 3, p373
Abstract: In this paper we test for the motives for adopting golden parachutes and Anti-Takeover Amendments (ATAs). Firms that exhibited financial characteristics that were associated with a greater probability of hostile raids were also more likely to adopt golden parachutes or ATAs. We also...
