TITLE

DOES APRIORITY INVOLVE NECESSITY?

AUTHOR(S)
Chavanayarn, Siraprapa
PUB. DATE
January 2010
SOURCE
Prajna Vihara;Jan-Jun2010, Vol. 11 Issue 1, p107
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Much has been discussed concerning apriority and its relation to the concept of necessity. Many philosophers have conventionally supposed that a proposition is known a priori only if it is necessarily true. According to Kant, for instance, the first philosopher who systematically discussed apriority, "necessity" is one of the criteria of a priori knowledge. Kant (1958) maintains that all a priori knowledge is necessarily true. Thus, from this conventional thought, many philosophers claim that apriority involves necessity, and rejecting the concept of necessity unavoidably affects the status of apriority. That is, if all a priori propositions need to be necessarily true, and we can prove that there is no necessarily true proposition, we are forced to conclude that there are no a priori propositions. However, this paper aims to propose that apriority does not involve necessity since all a priori propositions need not be necessarily true. The paper has been separated into three parts. Firstly, I will discuss the problem of necessity and its effect on the status of apriority. Secondly, I will argue that apriority does not involve necessity by considering the two following questions: (A) is there a necessary a posteriori proposition? And (B) is there a contingent a priori proposition? Thirdly, I will scrutinize the possible objections and try to defend my argument which will involve some further considerations about a priori justification.
ACCESSION #
57800747

 

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