TITLE

On the foundations of Bayesianism

AUTHOR(S)
Arnborg, S.; Sjo┬Ędin, G.
PUB. DATE
May 2001
SOURCE
AIP Conference Proceedings;2001, Vol. 568 Issue 1, p61
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
We discuss precise assumptions entailing Bayesianism in the line of investigations started by Cox, and relate them to a recent critique by Halpern. We show that every finite model which cannot be rescaled to probability violates a natural and simple refinability principle. A new condition, separability, was found sufficient and necessary for rescalability of infinite models. We finally characterize the acceptable ways to handle uncertainty in infinite models based on Cox's assumptions. Certain closure properties must be assumed before all the axioms of ordered fields are satisfied. Once this is done, a proper plausibility model can be embedded in an ordered field containing the reals, namely either standard probability (field of reals) for a real valued plausibility model, or extended probability (field of reals and infinitesimals) for an ordered plausibility model. The end result is that if our assumptions are accepted, all reasonable uncertainty management schemes must be based on sets of extended probability distributions and Bayes conditioning.
ACCESSION #
5665715

 

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics