TITLE

Taking Counterinsurgency to the Countryside

AUTHOR(S)
Kausek, Jeffrey
PUB. DATE
November 2010
SOURCE
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings;Nov2010, Vol. 136 Issue 11, p34
SOURCE TYPE
Conference Proceeding
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses how counterinsurgency by the U.S. in Afghanistan should focus on its rural population to win. It states that the armed forces often neglect rural areas and ignore things like advantages of guerrilla forces in these areas such as freedom of movement and a well-developed logistics network. It mentions that it is easy to gain trust of rural Afghans than those living in the cities and gaining their support is more important than targeting urban cities.
ACCESSION #
55494566

 

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