Actions Needed to Address Persistent Concerns with Efforts to Close Underground Radioactive Waste Tanks at DOE's Savannah River Site

September 2010
GAO Reports;9/14/2010, preceding p1
Government Documents
The article discusses the study conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) which examines actions needed to address persistent concerns to close underground radioactive waste tanks in Savannah River Site of the Department of Energy (DOE) in South Carolina. GAO is tasked to estimate costs of DOE in closing tanks and the steps to address challenges on the closure. In this regard, GAO recommends some strategies to address the issues including the clarification to the cost increases.


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