TITLE

Executive Stock Options: Still Plenty of Shenanigans?

AUTHOR(S)
Wyld, David C.
PUB. DATE
May 2010
SOURCE
Academy of Management Perspectives;May2010, Vol. 24 Issue 2, p79
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article reports on a study which investigated stock transactions involving senior executive stock options from 1996 through 2005. The study, conducted by David C. Cicero of the University of Delaware, was published in the "Journal of Finance" under the title "The manipulation of executive stock option exercise strategies: Information timing and backdating." It found that corporate executives were able to time the exercise of their stock options in order to maximize their personal profits, even after the imposition of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
ACCESSION #
51827777

 

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