TITLE

Foundations for contest success functions

AUTHOR(S)
Corchón, Luis; Dahm, Matthias
PUB. DATE
April 2010
SOURCE
Economic Theory;Apr2010, Vol. 43 Issue 1, p81
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In the literature, the outcome of contests is either interpreted as win probabilities or as shares of the prize. With this in mind, we examine two approaches to contest success functions (CSFs). In the first, we analyze the implications of contestants’ incomplete information concerning the ‘type’ of the contest administrator. While in the case of two contestants this approach can rationalize prominent CSFs, we show that it runs into difficulties when there are more agents. Our second approach interprets CSFs as sharing rules and establishes a connection to bargaining and claims problems which is independent of the number of contestants. Both approaches provide foundations for popular CSFs and guidelines for the definition of new ones.
ACCESSION #
48004657

 

Related Articles

  • Non-cooperative games with minmax objectives. Facchinei, Francisco; Pang, Jong-Shi; Scutari, Gesualdo // Computational Optimization & Applications;Oct2014, Vol. 59 Issue 1/2, p85 

    We consider noncooperative games where each player minimizes the sum of a smooth function, which depends on the player, and of a possibly nonsmooth function that is the same for all players. For this class of games we consider two approaches: one based on an augmented game that is applicable...

  • Game-Theoretic Models of Competition Between Producers with Random Product Yields Under Duopoly of Differentiated Goods. Kosarevych, K.; Yelejko, Ya. // Cybernetics & Systems Analysis;Jul2015, Vol. 51 Issue 4, p609 

    Models of quantitative competition under duopoly of differentiated goods are described in which the controlled variable (product yield) of a producer is considered to be a random quantity. The class of distributions of random product yields is singled out that guarantees the existence of...

  • Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry. Takahashi, Satoru // International Journal of Game Theory;2008, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p15 

    This paper investigates absorption and global accessibility under perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives. An action distribution in the society is absorbing if there is no equilibrium path escaping from the distribution, and globally accessible if, from every initial...

  • Efficiency in the trust game: an experimental study of precommitment. Bracht, Juergen; Feltovich, Nick // International Journal of Game Theory;2008, Vol. 37 Issue 1, p39 

    We experimentally test a precommitment mechanism for the trust game. Before the investor’s decision, the allocator places an amount into escrow, to be forfeited if he keeps the proceeds of investment for himself. We vary the available escrow amounts—in particular, whether there is...

  • Loss of skills in coordination games. Flesch, J.; Schoenmakers, G.; Vrieze, O. // International Journal of Game Theory;Oct2011, Vol. 40 Issue 4, p769 

    This paper deals with 2-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all diagonal payoffs are strictly positive and all non-diagonal payoffs are zero with the following additional property: At any stage beyond r, if a player has not played a certain action for...

  • Equilibria of the Games in Choice Form. Stefanescu, Anton; Ferrara, Massimiliano; Stefanescu, Maria // Journal of Optimization Theory & Applications;Dec2012, Vol. 155 Issue 3, p1060 

    Equilibrium in choice is a solution-concept for noncooperative games defined in a general framework-the game in choice form. There are two leading ideas of the new definition. One is that the players' preferences need not be explicitly represented, but earlier accepted solution concepts should...

  • A Cooperative Dual to the Nash Equilibrium for Two-Person Prescriptive Games. Corley, H. W.; Kwain, Phantipa // Journal of Applied Mathematics;2014, p1 

    An alternative to the Nash equilibrium (NE) is presented for two-person, one-shot prescriptive games in normal form, where the outcome is determined by an arbiter. The NE is the fundamental solution concept in noncooperative game theory. It is based on the assumption that players are completely...

  • Properly efficient Nash equilibrium in multicriteria noncooperative games. Fahem, Karima; Radjef, Mohammed // Mathematical Methods of Operations Research;Oct2015, Vol. 82 Issue 2, p175 

    The aim of this paper is to study the concept of properly efficient equilibrium for a multicriteria noncooperative strategic game. Using results of multicriteria optimization programming, we give some characterizations and existence results of this concept in the considered game.

  • Nondominated equilibrium solutions of a multiobjective two-person nonzero-sum game in extensive form and corresponding mathematical programming problem. Ichiro Nishizaki; Takuma Notsu // Journal of Global Optimization;Oct2008, Vol. 42 Issue 2, p201 

    Abstract  In most of studies on multiobjective noncooperative games, games are represented in normal form and a solution concept of Pareto equilibrium solutions which is an extension of Nash equilibrium solutions has been focused on. However, for analyzing economic situations and modeling...

Share

Read the Article

Courtesy of THE LIBRARY OF VIRGINIA

Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics