TITLE

Shareholder's right to vote - basic principles

AUTHOR(S)
Arsić, Zoran
PUB. DATE
July 2009
SOURCE
Proceedings of Novi Sad Faculty of Law / Zbornik Radova Pravnog ;2009, Vol. 43 Issue 2, p55
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The shareholder's main nonpecuniary right is that of voting at shareholders' meeting, where the will of the company as legal entity is formed. Basic principles of voting right are proportionality, unity of shares and uniform voting. Principle of proportionality means that each share, except non voting share, carries voting right in proportion to its nominal value. Concept of unity of share is based on understanding that rights and duties of shareholder as member of the company constitute a bundle. Therefore right to vote can not be transferred separately, but only as a part of share. Uniform voting means that shareholder can cast all votes belonging to one share in the same way.
ACCESSION #
47813461

 

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