TITLE

SEARCHING FOR GENERALIZATIONS IN BUSINESS MARKETING NEGOTIATIONS

AUTHOR(S)
Eliashberg, Jehoshua; Lilien, Gary L.; Kim., Nam
PUB. DATE
June 1995
SOURCE
Marketing Science;1995 Part 2 of 2, Vol. 14 Issue 3, pG47
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In this paper we investigate how to make empirical generalizations in marketing. We argue that for substantive empirical generalizations to exist in an area, there should be a sufficient body of relevant research about recurring phenomena. We outline criteria and a procedure to search for and identify such generalizations, and we apply the procedure to the area of business marketing negotiations. We find that, in spite of a sizable literature on business marketing negotiations, there appears to be little overlap between what researchers have studied to date and many characteristics of real-world bargaining situations. We do identify one significant generalization: that bargainers who are problem solvers settle disputes more efficiently than those who take adversarial positions. However, we note that a significant theory-practice gap exists that must be bridged before more substantive generalizations can be identified in the area of business marketing negotiations. More broadly, we suggest that issues such as the sampling or selection of research studies and the match of reported research with real phenomena are serious concerns in our search for empirical generalizations in marketing and that it is not apparent that such generalizations exist in all marketing domains.
ACCESSION #
4477192

 

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