TITLE

PREDICTING ADVERTISING PULSING POLICIES IN AN OLIGOPOLY: A MODEL AND EMPIRICAL TEST

AUTHOR(S)
Villas-Boas, J. Miguel
PUB. DATE
January 1993
SOURCE
Marketing Science;Winter93, Vol. 12 Issue 1, p88
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Given that firms pulse in advertising, should firms pulse in or out of phase? It is shown that out of phase maximizes the oligopoly profits and is also the Markov perfect equilibrium of the infinite horizon game. The basic intuition for this result comes from the following fact: it is more profitable to increase consideration when the competitor's consideration is lower. Evidence from several product categories seems to support this theoretical result.
ACCESSION #
4469520

 

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