TITLE

# The Role of the Untrue in Mathematics

AUTHOR(S)
Davis, Chandler
PUB. DATE
June 2009
SOURCE
Mathematical Intelligencer;Summer2009, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p4
SOURCE TYPE
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The article discusses the role of untrue in mathematical reasoning. The author said that human interlocutor is skeptical about the notion that meaningful proposition is either true or false in binary alternative where the methods of argument do not always depend on the truth status. The author added that mathematicians used arguments in premises that are not to concede in an arguendo under discrepancies between different entries.
ACCESSION #
44211400

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