TITLE

The bargaining process as a variable to explain implementation choices of international soft-law agreements: The Basel case study

AUTHOR(S)
Novembre, Valerio
PUB. DATE
February 2009
SOURCE
Journal of Banking Regulation;Mar2009, Vol. 10 Issue 2, p128
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to understand the conditions under which an international soft-law agreement may result in widespread compliance across different countries. In particular, it will be assessed whether the number and size of the actors involved in the bargaining process may be able to explain the contents of the accord and, consequently, the level of regulatory isomorphism it is able to create. A game theory coordination model is suggested as a theoretical answer to this question, whereas the two Basel Accord cases are used to test the model empirically. The Basel example has a twofold interest. On the one hand, the Basel I agreement is widely cited as a primary example of successful soft-law international agreement because of its worldwide implementation. On the other hand, the recent approval of the Basel II Accord and the unenthusiastic way it has been received in many countries makes it possible to contrast it with the Basel I experience. The appreciation of the circumstances that led to the two Accords may be suggestive of the reasons behind the widespread adoption of the Basel I Accord as opposed to the piecemeal implementation of Basel II.Journal of Banking Regulation (2009) 10, 128–152. doi:10.1057/jbr.2008.23
ACCESSION #
36683098

 

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