TITLE

A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation

AUTHOR(S)
Penn, Elizabeth
PUB. DATE
July 2008
SOURCE
Public Choice;Jul2008, Vol. 136 Issue 1/2, p201
SOURCE TYPE
Academic Journal
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
In this paper I analyze a 3-person voting game in which players sequentially choose amendments to a bill and then vote sophisticatedly on the resulting agenda. This game differs from previous work on endogenous agenda formation in that the number of items on the agenda is not fixed. Players keep making proposals until they can do no better. I find that there is a nonempty set of minimax equilibrium outcomes to the game, and that this set contains the simple von Neumann–Morgenstern stable set.
ACCESSION #
32484724

 

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