The empirical foundation and justification of knowledge

Chen Jiaming
March 2008
Frontiers of Philosophy in China;Mar2008, Vol. 3 Issue 1, p67
Academic Journal
The article offers information about the empirical foundation and justification of knowledge. Sellars believe that the doctrine of givenness is a myth which is contrasting to the presence of immediate perceptual experience. The discussions in the Western epistemology are focused the conceptual contents of sensory experience, and if there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. Thus, it is suggested that the real dilemma starts if one is unable to differentiate several relationships with perception of singular beliefs and universal beliefs, and in giving justification of singular beliefs for universal beliefs.


Related Articles

  • Reply to Fumerton, Huemer, and McGrath. Siegel, Susanna // Philosophical Studies;Feb2013, Vol. 162 Issue 3, p749 

    The article offers the author's insights on the justification of beliefs based on its etiology and epistemic rationality. The author states that wishful thinking, prejudice and fearful thinking are all from poor beliefs which may due to mental states that can influence the justification. She...

  • Counter-evidence and the duty to critically reflect. Katzoff, Charlotte // Analysis;Jan2000, Vol. 60 Issue 1, p89 

    Focuses on the role of counter-evidence in epistemic justification. Types of duties serving as basis for epistemic justification; Reflection of epistemic duty in an individual's belief; Evidentialist notion of justification; Dependence of the epistemic right to remain in doubt on the distinction...

  • The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation. McCain, Kevin // Philosophical Studies;Jul2012, Vol. 159 Issue 3, p357 

    It is commonplace to distinguish between propositional justification (having good reasons for believing p) and doxastic justification (believing p on the basis of those good reasons).One necessary requirement for bridging the gap between S's merely having propositional justification that p and...

  • The degree of epistemic justification and the conjunction fallacy. Shogenji, Tomoji // Synthese;Jan2012, Vol. 184 Issue 1, p29 

    This paper describes a formal measure of epistemic justification motivated by the dual goal of cognition, which is to increase true beliefs and reduce false beliefs. From this perspective the degree of epistemic justification should not be the conditional probability of the proposition given the...

  • Actions, Beliefs, and Consequences. McCarthy, David // Philosophical Studies;Apr1998, Vol. 90 Issue 1, p57 

    The article probes whether an agent's act is permissible depends, in part, on what the consequences of the act will be, and not on what she believes they will be. There are many variations on this. For example, justification may have more to do with what it is reasonable for the agent to believe...

  • Reliabilism in philosophy. Goldberg, Sanford // Philosophical Studies;Jan2009, Vol. 142 Issue 1, p105 

    The following three propositions appear to be individually defensible but jointly inconsistent: (1) reliability is a necessary condition on epistemic justification; (2) on contested matters in philosophy, my beliefs are not reliably formed; (3) some of these beliefs are epistemically justified....

  • Modest deontologism in epistemology. Richard Feldman // Synthese;Apr2008, Vol. 161 Issue 3, p339 

    Abstract  Deontologism in epistemology holds that epistemic justification may be understood in terms of “deontological” sentences about what one ought to believe or is permitted to believe, or what one deserves praise for believing, or in some similar way. If deonotologism is...

  • IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BEHAVIOR KNOWLEDGE? Hammonds, Frank // Behavior & Philosophy;2010, Vol. 38, p49 

    Edmund Gettier (1963) argued against defining knowledge as justified true belief. Using two examples, he demonstrated that (a) believing a proposition to be true, (b) having justification for that belief, and (c) the proposition in fact being true, do not constitute sufficient conditions for one...

  • Epistemological asymmetries between belief and experience. Huemer, Michael // Philosophical Studies;Feb2013, Vol. 162 Issue 3, p741 

    The article discusses the differentiation of belief and experience based on epistemological method, in contrast to S. Siegel's central thesis on the etiology of experience. It mentions that one's justification for believing is affected by two factors such as sources of justification and...


Read the Article


Sign out of this library

Other Topics