How Do Corporate Boards Evolve?

Rehbein, Kathleen
February 2008
Academy of Management Perspectives;Feb2008, Vol. 22 Issue 1, p63
Academic Journal
The article discusses the establishment and behavior of corporate boards. The author discusses different perceptions of corporate boards that suggest boards are structured to represent shareholder interests or structured to increase their own power and influence. She discusses a study that suggests corporate board structure can be affected by corporation size and complexity, the need to monitor manager behavior or the influence of chief executive officers (CEOs). The author suggests research should be conducted to determine how corporate boards adapt to organizational changes and growth.


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