MANAGING COUNTERINSURGENCY: LESSONS FROM MALAYA
- chapter twelve: Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957-60). Comber, Leon // Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch i;2007, p269
Chapter 12 of the book "Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency" is presented. It discusses what the Special Branch went through during Great Britain's move to transfer power to an Independent Malayan government and its role in the...
- LEARNING ABOUT COUNTERINSURGENCY. Kiszely, John // Military Review;Mar/Apr2007, Vol. 87 Issue 2, p5
The article presents a reprint of the article "Learning About Counterinsurgency," which appeared in the December 2006 issue of the "Royal United Services Institute Journal." It presents an analysis of several problems facing militaries in learning the lessons of counterinsurgency. It defines...
- Cutting the Arc. // Time;4/6/1962, Vol. 79 Issue 14, p33
The article reports on the use of the strategic villages method by the U.S. and British military advisers in South Vietnam in March 1962 to reduce the Communist Viet Cong forces in the country. It states that the approach was first implemented by the British troops to suppress a Communist...
- Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife(n1). NAGL, JOHN A. // World Affairs;Spring99, Vol. 161 Issue 4, p193
Focuses on the British and American army counterinsurgency learning during the Malayan emergency and the Vietnam War. Ideas and international relations; Evaluation of the literature on military innovation; Evaluation of the effectiveness of learning theory as a tool for analyzing military...
- chapter seven: The Special Branch and the Briggs Plan. Comber, Leon // Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch i;2007, p147
Chapter 7 of the book "Malaya's Secret Police 1945-60: The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency" is presented. It describes the Briggs Plan, an anti-Communist strategy devised by British General Harold Briggs which a combined offensive that involved the police, army and civil...
- Civil-Military Operations Joint Doctrine and the Malayan Emergency. Hamby, Joel E. // JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly;Autumn2002, Issue 32, p54
Focuses on the British experience during the Malayan Emergency from 1948 to 1960. Factors responsible for the success in countering the communist insurgency in Malaya; Significance of leadership during the Malayan Emergency.
- Not by Bombs Alone. Simpson, Jay Gordon // JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly;Summer99, Issue 22, p91
Discusses the lessons brought by the history of Malayan Emergency in Malaya. Demonstration on the support of military power on low intensity operations; Success of communists in doing terrorist acts; Complexity of applying airpower in the conflict. INSET: Malaya, 1948â€“1960..
- 'Bribing the Reds to Give Up': Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency. Ramakrishna, K // War in History;Jul2002, Vol. 9 Issue 3, p332
This article examines the rationale for and evolution of the Malayan government's rewards for information policy during the Emergency. The policy was formulated as a means of exploiting the rural Chinese peasant/terrorist's fundamentally materialistic outlook. The policy went through some...
- Turning Point. // Time;11/3/1952, Vol. 60 Issue 19, p31
The article reports that shooting is getting under control in the battle between Malaya and Communist terrorists.