Ladwig III, Walter C.
May 2007
Military Review;May/Jun2007, Vol. 87 Issue 3, p56
The article focuses on the Malayan Emergency, a British-led campaign against Communist guerrillas. It says that the Malayan Emergency is a case of successful counterinsurgency effort and demonstrates a method of achieving close coordination and effective management of civil and military resources. It mentions that the newly established government of the Federation of Malaya was not configured to effectively hold a coordinated counterinsurgency campaign during the outbreak of the Emergency.


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