TITLE

Display Tech, Wary of Swooping Vultures, Adopts Poison Pill

AUTHOR(S)
Appin, Rick
PUB. DATE
September 1999
SOURCE
Mergers & Acquisitions Report;09/20/99, Vol. 12 Issue 37, p12
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Reports the implementation of the antitakeover strategy by Display Technologies, Inc. (DTI) for fear of takeout by larger competitors. Information on the nature and business operation of the firm; Analysis of William Bradner of Auerbach, Pollak & Richardson company on the rumor; Products manufactured by DTI; Revenue earned by DTI for the second quarter of 1999.
ACCESSION #
2309750

 

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