Metz, Thomas F.; Tait Jr, William J.; McNealy, J. Michael
July 2005
Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin;Jul-Sep2005, Vol. 31 Issue 3, p10
The authors discusses the lessons they have learned about military intelligence during their tour in Iraq. A deep human intelligence capability to understand the enemy, his intentions and how to take the fight to him was needed in the counterinsurgency battle. They consider the signal intelligence collection as the most spectacular intelligence discipline on the battlefield as they were able to collect on many targets cued by other intelligence disciplines.


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