Neuhaus, Richard John
August 1996
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life;Aug/Sep1996, Issue 65, p74
Reports on the criticism being faced of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1996. Information on the book "Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the Constitution," published by the Harvard University Press; Views of Ronald Dworkin of Oxford and New York University on U.S. judiciary; Comments from Dworkin on Supreme Court judges.


Related Articles

  • The Hearings and Original Intent. Blum, Bill // ABA Journal;Dec87, Vol. 73 Issue 12, p78 

    Interviews legal scholar Ronald Dworkin about the doctrine of original intent and the effort to block Robert Bork's confirmation to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987. Difference between original intent and strict constructionism; View that the framers of the U.S. Constitution shared the...

  • WHILE WE'RE AT IT. Neuhaus, Richard John // First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life;Feb1997, Issue 70, p66 

    Presents views of Ronald Dworkin, professor of law at Oxford University in England and New York University in New York City, on the democratic process. Comparison of judges and novelists; Position of Dworkin on the 1976 Buckley decision of the U.S. Supreme Court on free speech; Support for...

  • Dworkin's Morality and its Limited Implications for Law. Donnelly-Lazarov, Bebhinn // Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence;Jan2012, Vol. 25 Issue 1, p79 

    The article discusses that judicial engagement with morality is a necessary feature of legal practice and law in adjudication and states that Ronald Dworkin's account of morality has limited implications for law. It further states that Dworkin too is concerned with a form of engagement between...

  • Should The U. S. Supreme Court Exercise More Judicial Restraint In Decisions Involving The States? CON. Jones, Charles A. // Congressional Digest;Oct59, Vol. 38 Issue 10, p233 

    The article argues against the exercise of judicial restraint by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Committee on Federal-State relationships made an observation that the overall tendency of decisions of the Supreme Court in recent years has been to press the extension of Federal power. And that to an...

  • Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separation. MARCEAU, JUSTIN // Connecticut Law Review;Feb2013, Vol. 45 Issue 3, p933 

    Beginning in 1977, the U.S. Supreme Court instructed lawyers and lower courts that when there is no majority decision "in support of the judgment . . ., the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." For...

  • Explaining Theoretical Disagreement. Leiter, Brian // University of Chicago Law Review;Summer2009, Vol. 76 Issue 3, p1215 

    Scott Shapiro has recently argued that Ronald Dworkin posed a new objection to legal positivism in Law's Empire, to which positivists, he says, have not adequately responded. Positivists, the objection goes, have no satisfactory account of what Dworkin calls "theoretical disagreement" about law,...

  • The Judgeship of All Citizens: Dworkin's Protestantism About Law. Lee, Win-chiat // Law & Philosophy;Jan2015, Vol. 34 Issue 1, p23 

    This article gives an account of what Ronald Dworkin calls 'the protestant attitude' towards law. Dworkin's protestantist claim that the interpretive attitude towards law is to be taken not only by judges, but also by ordinary citizens is explained and defended. The account of Dworkin's...

  • LEGAL THEORY FROM THE REGULATIVE POINT OF VIEW. GOLANSKI, ALANI // Cumberland Law Review;2013, Vol. 44 Issue 1, p1 

    Article addresses the concept of a legal system from the regulative point of view. Topics discussed include Professor Ronald Dworkin's vision of the judge as practical philosopher; role of political morality in adjudication; and Dworkin's theoretical objections to the possibility of a conceptual...

  • LEGAL HUMANISM AND LAW-AS-INTEGRITY.  // Cambridge Law Journal;Jul2008, Vol. 67 Issue 2, p352 

    According to Ronald Dworkin, all judges are by necessity philosophers, and no judge is a better philosopher than Hercules. This superhuman jurist understands that law's empire embraces not just decisions about rights made in the past, but also rights implicit in the theory of political morality...


Read the Article


Sorry, but this item is not currently available from your library.

Try another library?
Sign out of this library

Other Topics