TITLE

THE TRUTH, YOU SAY

AUTHOR(S)
Neuhaus, Richard John
PUB. DATE
November 1990
SOURCE
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion & Public Life;Nov1990, Issue 7, p67
SOURCE TYPE
Periodical
DOC. TYPE
Article
ABSTRACT
Explores the views of Richard Rorty of the University of Virginia on the notions of truth and reality. Basis of Rorty's notion of truth; Way to get rid of war and violence.
ACCESSION #
17727203

 

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