Do Logical Truths Carry Information?

Bremer, Manuel E.
November 2003
Minds & Machines;Nov2003, Vol. 13 Issue 4, p567
Academic Journal
The paper deals with the question whether logical truth carry information. On the one hand it seems that we gain new information by drawing inferences or arriving at some theorems. On the other hand the formal accounts of information and information content which are most widely known today say that logical truth carry no information at all. The latter is shown by considering these accounts. Then several ways to deal with the dilemma are distinguished, especially syntactic and ontological solutions. A version of a syntactical solution is favoured.


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