Moral Sentimentalism

Slote, Michael
March 2004
Ethical Theory & Moral Practice;Mar2004, Vol. 7 Issue 1, p3
Academic Journal
In a way reminiscent of Hume's approach in the Treatise, a reviving moral sentimentalism can use the notion of empathy to ground both its normative account of moral obligation and its metaethical account of moral language. A virtuous person is empathically caring about others and expresses such feeling/motivation in her actions. But the judgment that something is right or good is also based in empathy, and the sentimentalist can espouse a form of moral realism by making use of a Kripkean reference-fixer theory of the role of feelings of approval and disapproval in moral judgment.


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